Abstract
Our work is motivated by a recent trend in cryptographic research. Protocol problems that have previously been solved subject to intractability assumptions are now being solved without these assumptions. Examples of this trend include a new completeness theorem for multiparty protocols [BGW,CCD], and a protocol for byzantine agreement using private channels [FM]. These breakthroughs illustrate both the strengths and the weaknesses of using the cryptographic model. Devising first a protocol that uses cryptographic assumptions can give powerful intuition that later allows one to create a protocol that works without assumptions. However, there is a danger that the cryptographic assumptions one uses can become inextricably bound up in the protocol. It may take years before these assumptions can be ironed out of the final protocol.
Supported in part by an NSERC Postgraduate Scholarship. Some of this research was performed while visiting Bell Communication Research.
Research supported in part by a Fannie and John Hertz foundation fellowship, and NSF grant 865727-DCR. Some of this research was performed while visiting Bell Communication Research.
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© 1990 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Crépeau, C., Kilian, J. (1990). Weakening Security Assumptions and Oblivious Transfer. In: Goldwasser, S. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO’ 88. CRYPTO 1988. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 403. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34799-2_1
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