Abstract
We explain how to forge public parameters for the Digital Signature Standard with two known messages which always produce the same set of valid signatures (what we call a collision). This attack is thwarted by using the generation algorithm suggested in the specifications of the Standard, so it proves one always need to check proper generation. We also present a similar attack when using this generation algorithm within a complexity 274, which is better than the birthday attack which seeks for collisions on the underlying hash function.
Laboratoire d’Informatique de l’Ecole Normale Supérieure, research group affiliated with the CNRS
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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Vaudenay, S. (1996). Hidden Collisions on DSS. In: Koblitz, N. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’96. CRYPTO 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1109. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68697-5_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68697-5_7
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