Abstract
The classic example of common value is represented by oil fields which are auctioned to private oil companies. One of the famous cases is that of the Chinese oil company Natural Petroleum Corporation which had to pay an exorbitant price at the auction of oil drilling rights held by Venezuela in 1997. This is the background.
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© 2015 Gregor Berz
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Berz, G. (2015). Winner’s Curse in an Auction. In: Game Theory Bargaining and Auction Strategies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137475428_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137475428_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-69293-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-47542-8
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