New Multilinear Maps Over the Integers

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Abstract. In the last few years, cryptographic multilinear maps have proved their tremendous potential as building blocks for new constructions, in particular the first viable approach to general program obfuscation. After the first candidate construction by Garg, Gentry and Halevi (GGH) based on ideal lattices, a second construction over the integers was described by Coron, Lepoint and Tibouchi (CLT). However the CLT scheme was recently broken by Cheon et al.; the attack works by computing the eigenvalues of a diagonalizable matrix over $\mathbb{Q}$ derived from the multilinear map.

In this paper we describe a new candidate multilinear map over the integers. Our construction is based on CLT but with a new arithmetic technique that makes the zero-testing element non-linear in the encoding, which prevents the Cheon et al. attack. Our new construction is relatively practical as its efficiency is comparable to the original CLT scheme. Moreover the subgroup membership and decisional linear assumptions appear to hold in the new setting.

1 Introduction

Multilinear Maps. Since the breakthrough construction of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a], there has been a growing interest in *cryptographic multilinear maps*. They have spurred scores of new cryptographic applications. Chiefly among them is possibly the first proposed approach to general program obfuscation [GGH+13b]. Currently only three candidate constructions are known. Shorty after the first candidate construction of multilinear maps based on ideal lattices [GGH13a] (which we will refer to as GGH), Coron, Lepoint and Tibouchi proposed a second construction over the integers (CLT) using the same general paradigm [CLT13]. Recently, Gentry, Gorbunov and Halevi proposed another multilinear maps in which the map is defined with respect to a directed acyclic graph [GGH15].

A straightforward application of multilinear maps is multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange with $\kappa + 1$ users, where κ is the maximum level of the multilinear map scheme. Initially each user publishes a level-1 encoding of a random element while keeping a level-0 encoding of the same element private.

Then each user can compute the product its level-0 by the product of the level-1 encodings of the other users. With $\kappa + 1$ users this gives a level-κ encoding from which the same secret value can be extracted by all users. The security of the protocol relies on a new hardness assumption which is a natural extension of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.

The CLT Multilinear Map Over the Integers. We recall the multilinear maps scheme over the integers from [CLT13]. One generates n secret primes p_i and publishes $x_0 = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p_i$ (where n is large enough to ensure security); one also generates n small secret primes g_i and a random secret integer z modulo x_0. The message space is $R = \mathbb{Z}_{g_1} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{g_n}$. A level-$k$ encoding of a vector $\boldsymbol{m} = (m_i) \in R$ is then an integer c such that for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$:

$$c \equiv \frac{r_i \cdot g_i + m_i}{z^k} \pmod{p_i} \tag{1}$$

for some small random integers r_i; the integer c is therefore defined modulo x_0 by CRT. Encodings can then be added and multiplied modulo x_0, as long as the noise r_i is such that $r_i \cdot g_i + m_i < p$ for each i. The multiplication of a level-i encoding by a level-j encoding gives an encoding at level $i + j$.

For level-κ encodings one defines a zero-testing parameter p_{zt} with:

$$p_{zt} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} h_i \cdot \left(z^\kappa \cdot g_i^{-1} \bmod p_i \right) \cdot \frac{x_0}{p_i} \bmod x_0$$

for some small integers h_i. Given a level-κ encoding c as in (1), as a zero-testing procedure one computes $\omega = p_{zt} \cdot c \bmod x_0$ which gives:

$$\omega = \sum_{i=1}^{n} h_i \cdot \left(r_i + m_i \cdot (g_i^{-1} \bmod p_i) \right) \cdot \frac{x_0}{p_i} \bmod x_0. \tag{2}$$

If $m_i = 0$ for all i, since the r_i's and h_i's are small, we obtain that ω is small compared to x_0; this enables to test whether c is an encoding of $\boldsymbol{0}$ or not. Moreover for non-zero encodings the leading bits of ω only depend on the m_i's and not on the noise r_i; for level-κ encodings this enables to extract a function of the m_i's only, which eventually defines a degree-κ multilinear map.

Cheon et al. Attack. The CLT scheme above was completely broken by a recent attack from Cheon, Han Lee, Ryu and Stehlé [CHL+15]; the attack runs in polynomial time, and recovers all secret parameters. The attack works by computing the eigenvalues of a diagonalizable matrix over $\mathbb{Q}$ derived from the multilinear map. More precisely, when applying the zero-testing procedure to the product of two encodings x and x', where x is an encoding of 0, the resulting ω in (2) can be seen as a diagonal quadratic form over $\mathbb{Z}$ in the CRT components $x \bmod p_i$ and $x' \bmod p_i$. By computing the values ω_{jk} of the quadratic form for n^2 product pairs of encodings $x_j \cdot x'_k$, one can then recover the coefficients of the quadratic form using eigendecomposition, which reveals all the secret p_i's and completely breaks the scheme. We recall the attack in more details in Sect. 3.

Tentative Fixes. Shortly after Cheon et al. attack, two independent approaches to fix the CLT scheme have been proposed on the Cryptology ePrint Archive, due to Garg, Gentry, Halevi and Zhandry on the one hand [GGHZ14, Sect. 7][1], and Boneh, Wu and Zimmerman on the other [BWZ14]. However, both countermeasures were shown to be insecure in [CLT14, CGH+15]. Indeed, although these countermeasures do not expose encodings of zero, the value ω from the zero-testing procedure can still be expressed as a quadratic form in the CRT components of encodings. As a result, they can both be broken by a variant of the original Cheon et al. attack. Further extensions of the Cheon et al. attack along those lines are presented in [GHMS14, CGH+15].

Our New Construction. Our new construction keeps the same CLT encodings but departs from the two previous countermeasures by modifying the zero-testing procedure itself. Namely, we modify the definition of the zero-testing element p_{zt} so that ω cannot be expressed as a quadratic form anymore. For this we use a new arithmetic technique that maps the n CRT components $c \bmod p_i$ to some value modulo an independent integer N, so that the resulting ω in the zero-testing procedure depends on the CRT components in a non-linear way, rather than linearly as in (2).

The technique works as follows. Consider a level-κ encoding c as in (1); by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we can write a relation of the form:

$$c = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(r_i + m_i \cdot (g_i^{-1} \bmod p_i)\right) \cdot u_i - a \cdot x_0 \tag{3}$$

over $\mathbb{Z}$ for some $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, where the u_i's are the CRT coefficients corresponding to the primes p_i's, and scaled by $g_i \cdot z^{-\kappa}$ for each i. Let N be a large integer and let $p_{zt} \in \mathbb{Z}_N$. For the zero-testing procedure we compute $\omega = p_{zt} \cdot c \bmod N$ which gives from (3):

$$\omega \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(r_i + m_i \cdot (g_i^{-1} \bmod p_i)\right) \cdot v_i - a \cdot v_0 \pmod{N} \tag{4}$$

where $v_i := p_{zt} \cdot u_i \bmod N$ and $v_0 := p_{zt} \cdot x_0 \bmod N$. Assume now that we can generate p_{zt} and N such that all the v_i's are small compared to N, including v_0. Now if $m_i = 0$ for all i, since the r_i's are small, the integer a in (3) is also small, which implies that ω in (4) will also be small compared to N. This enables to test whether c is an encoding of 0 or not. As previously for level-κ encodings one can then extract a function of the m_i's only, which gives a degree-κ multilinear map. We show that such an element p_{zt} can be efficiently generated for any large enough N, owing to the particular structure of the CRT coefficients u_i.

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[1] We refer to the revised version of [GGHZ14] of November 12 2014, accessible on the Cryptology ePrint Archive.

Security Analysis. By comparing Eqs. (2) and (4), we see that the original CLT scheme is actually a particular case, with $N = x_0$ and $v_0 = 0$. Therefore the main difference in the new scheme is that $v_0 \neq 0$, which causes the value ω in (4) to depend on the integer a in (3). But that integer a depends on the CRT components r_i in a non-linear way. As a result, it is no longer true that the value ω computed from encoding products $x_j \cdot x_k'$ can be expressed as a quadratic form in the CRT components of x_j and x_k', and the Cheon et al. attack is thus thwarted.

Another difference with the original CLT scheme is that we cannot publish $x_0 = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p_i$ anymore. Namely for encodings of 0 we get a small ω and therefore (4) holds over $\mathbb{Z}$. Therefore from x_0 one could compute $v_0 = p_{zt} \cdot x_0 \bmod N$ and apply the Cheon et al. attack modulo v_0 instead of over $\mathbb{Z}$. It is not a problem to keep x_0 private, however, as we can mimic the technique introduced by van Dijk et al. for their fully homomorphic encryption scheme over the integers [DGHV10] and approximate modular reduction by x_0 with a ladder of encodings of zero of increasing sizes.

We provide a detailed security analysis of our new construction in Sect. 3 (for the Cheon et al. attack and its variants) and Sect. 4 (for lattice attacks). We also explain why the subgroup membership (SubM) and decisional linear (DLIN) problems, which are known to be easy in the GGH scheme [GGH13a], seem to be hard in our new setting.

Implementation. We describe an implementation of our scheme, with a few optimizations. Instead of using a ladder of encodings of 0 at every level, we publish a small multiple x_0' of x_0 so that intermediate encodings can be reduced modulo x_0'; only at the last level do we use a ladder of a few level-κ encodings of 0. Additionally, to reduce the size of public parameters, we store only a small subset of the public elements needed for re-randomization and combine them pairwise to generate the full public parameters, as in [CLT13]; such an optimization was originally described in [GH11]. With these optimizations our scheme is relatively practical; for reasonable security parameters a multipartite Diffie-Hellman computation with 7 users requires about 30 seconds, with a public parameter size of roughly 6 GBytes; a proof-of-concept implementation is available at [Lep15].

2   New Multilinear Map Over the Integers

In this section we define our new multilinear scheme. Our scheme is actually a *graded encoding scheme* (GES) as in previous works [GGH13a, CLT13]; we recall the notion of GES in the full version of this paper [CLT15]. As explained in introduction, our new multilinear map scheme keeps the same CLT encodings as given by (1), with two main differences:

1. The zero-testing parameter $\boldsymbol{p}_{zt}$ is computed differently, so that the CRT components modulo p_i of a level-κ encoding c are mapped to some value

modulo an independent integer N, instead of modulo x_0. The resulting $\boldsymbol{\omega}$ in the zero-testing procedure then depends on those CRT components in a non-linear way, rather than linearly in the original CLT scheme, which prevents the Cheon et al. attack.

2. The integer $x_0 = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p_i$ is kept private. For re-randomization, this implies that we must slightly modify the proof of statistical indistinguishability. To reduce the size of intermediate encodings back to the size of x_0, we publish a ladder of encodings of 0. In Sect. 5 we describe a simple optimization with a public multiple x_0' of x_0.

2.1 Scheme Description

System Parameters. The system parameters are similar to the original CLT scheme. One first defines the security parameter λ and the required multilinearity level $\kappa \leqslant \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$. Based on λ and κ, we choose:

- n: the vector dimension
- η: the bit-size of the primes p_i
- α: the bit-size of the primes g_i
- ρ: the bit-size of the randomness used in encodings

and various other parameters that will be specified later. The constraints that these parameters must satisfy are described in Sect. 2.2. For integers z, p we denote the reduction of z modulo p by $(z \bmod p)$ or $[z]_p$ with $-p/2 < [z]_p \leqslant p/2$. For integers $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ we denote $\mathsf{CRT}_{p_1,\ldots,p_n}(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ the unique integer x such that $x \equiv x_i \bmod p_i$ for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$ and $0 \leqslant x < \prod_{i=1}^{n} p_i$.

As in the original CLT scheme a level-k encoding of a vector $\boldsymbol{m} = (m_i)$ is an integer c such that for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$:

$$c \equiv \frac{r_i \cdot g_i + m_i}{z^k} \pmod{p_i} \tag{5}$$

where the r_i's are ρ-bit random integers (specific to the encoding c), with the following secret parameters: the p_i's are random η-bit prime integers, the g_i's are random α-bit primes, and the denominator z is a random (invertible) integer modulo $x_0 = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p_i$. The integer c is therefore defined by CRT modulo x_0, but as opposed to the original CLT scheme, x_0 is kept secret. We denote by γ the size of x_0 in bits. As in the CLT scheme the domain is the ring $R = \mathbb{Z}_{g_1} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{g_n}$, so that for $\boldsymbol{m} = (m_i) \in R$ the components m_i are defined modulo g_i for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$.

Instance Generation: $(\mathsf{pp}, \boldsymbol{p}_{zt}) \leftarrow \mathsf{instGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\kappa)$. Instance generation is similar to [CLT13], except for the generation of $\boldsymbol{p}_{zt}$; moreover x_0 is kept private. We generate n secret random η-bit primes p_i and compute $x_0 = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p_i$. We generate a random invertible integer z modulo x_0. We generate n random α-bit prime integers g_i, and various other parameters that will be specified later.

We publish the parameters $(\mathsf{pp}, \boldsymbol{p}_{zt})$ with

$$\mathsf{pp} = \left(n, \eta, \alpha, \rho, \beta, \tau, \ell, \mu, y, \{x_j'\}_{j=1}^{\ell}, \{X_j^{(k)}\}, \{x_j\}_{j=1}^{\tau}, \{\Pi_j\}_{j=1}^{n+1}, s \right).$$

Sampling Level-Zero Encodings: $c \leftarrow \mathsf{samp}(\mathsf{pp})$. Since the primes p_i's in (5) must remain secret, the user cannot encode a vector $\boldsymbol{m} \in R$ by CRT directly from (5). Instead, as in [CLT13], a level-0 encoding c is generated as a random subset sum of random level-0 encodings x'_j from the public parameters. The only difference with [CLT13] is that the random subset-sum is computed over $\mathbb{Z}$ instead of modulo x_0, since x_0 is not public.

Therefore we publish as part as our instance generation a set of ℓ integers x'_j, where each x'_j encodes at level-0 the column vector $\boldsymbol{a}_j \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ of a secret matrix $\boldsymbol{A} = (a_{ij}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times \ell}$, where each component a_{ij} is randomly generated in $[0, g_i) \cap \mathbb{Z}$. More precisely, using the CRT modulo x_0 we generate integers x'_j such that:

$$1 \leqslant j \leqslant \ell, \qquad x'_j \equiv r'_{ij} \cdot g_i + a_{ij} \pmod{p_i} \tag{6}$$

where the r'_{ij}'s are randomly generated in $(-2^\rho, 2^\rho) \cap \mathbb{Z}$.

To generate a level-0 encoding c, we first generate a random binary vector $\boldsymbol{b} = (b_j) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and output the level-0 encoding

$$c = \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} b_j \cdot x'_j.$$

From (6), this gives $c \equiv (\sum_{j=1}^{\ell} r'_{ij} b_j) \cdot g_i + \sum_{j=1}^{\ell} a_{ij} b_j \pmod{p_i}$; as required the output c is a level-0 encoding:

$$c \equiv r_i \cdot g_i + m_i \pmod{p_i} \tag{7}$$

of some vector $\boldsymbol{m} = \boldsymbol{A} \cdot \boldsymbol{b} \in R$ which is a random subset-sum of the column vectors $\boldsymbol{a}_j$. We note that for such level-0 encodings we get $|r_i \cdot g_i + m_i| \leqslant \ell \cdot 2^{\rho + \alpha}$ for all i. As in [CLT13] by applying the leftover hash lemma over $R = \mathbb{Z}_{g_1} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{g_n}$ the distribution of $\boldsymbol{m}$ can be made statistically close to uniform over R.

Lemma 1. ([CLT13]). *Let* $c \leftarrow \mathsf{samp}(\mathsf{pp})$ *and write* $c \equiv r_i \cdot g_i + m_i \pmod{p_i}$. *Assume* $\ell \geqslant n \cdot \alpha + 2\lambda$. *The distribution of* $(\mathsf{pp}, \boldsymbol{m})$ *is statistically close to the distribution of* $(\mathsf{pp}, \boldsymbol{m}')$ *where* $\boldsymbol{m}' \leftarrow R$.

As opposed to [CLT13] we cannot reduce c modulo x_0; we only have the upper-bound $|c| \leqslant \ell \cdot 2^\gamma$, where γ is the size of x_0 in bits. In the full version of this paper [CLT15], we show that instead of random sampling one can also publicly encode elements from the domain R, using a technique described in [BWZ14].

Encoding at Higher Levels: $c_k \leftarrow \mathsf{enc}(\mathsf{pp}, k, c)$. As in [CLT13], to allow encoding at higher levels, we publish as part of our instance-generation a level-one random encoding of $\boldsymbol{1}$, namely an integer y such that:

$$y \equiv \frac{r_i \cdot g_i + 1}{z} \pmod{p_i}$$

for random $r_i \in (-2^\rho, 2^\rho) \cap \mathbb{Z}$; as previously the integer y is computed by CRT modulo x_0. Given a level-0 encoding c of $\boldsymbol{m} \in R$ as given by (7), we can then compute a level-1 encoding of the same $\boldsymbol{m}$ by computing over $\mathbb{Z}$:

$$c_1 = c \cdot y.$$

Namely we obtain as required:

$$c_1 \equiv \frac{r_i' \cdot g_i + m_i}{z} \pmod{p_i}$$

for some integers r_i'. From $|c| \leqslant \ell \cdot 2^\gamma$, we obtain $|c_1| \leqslant \ell \cdot 2^{2\gamma}$.

The difference with [CLT13] is that we cannot reduce c_1 modulo x_0. Instead we provide a ladder of level-1 encodings of zero $X_j^{(1)}$ of increasing size, so that the size of a level-1 encoding can be progressively reduced down to the size of x_0, as in the DGHV scheme [DGHV10, Sect. 3.3.1]. Specifically, for $j = 0, \ldots, \gamma + \lfloor \log_2 \ell \rfloor$, we set:

$$X_j^{(1)} = \mathsf{CRT}_{p_1,\ldots,p_n}\left([r_{1j} \cdot g_1/z]_{p_1}, \ldots, [r_{nj} \cdot g_n/z]_{p_n}\right) + q_j \cdot x_0$$

where $r_{ij} \leftarrow (-2^\rho, 2^\rho) \cap \mathbb{Z}$ and $q_j \leftarrow [2^{\gamma+j-1}/x_0, 2^{\gamma+j}/x_0) \cap \mathbb{Z}$.

We can then iteratively reduce the size of c_1 down to the size of x_0, first by $X_{\gamma+\lfloor \log_2 \ell \rfloor}^{(1)}$ and eventually by $X_0^{(1)}$. Since the size reduction is done bit-by-bit, at each step some integer $b_j \cdot X_j^{(1)}$ is subtracted from c_1, for $b_j \in \{0, 1\}$. Therefore the noise increases additively by at most $(\gamma + \lfloor \log_2 \ell \rfloor + 1) \cdot 2^\rho$ in absolute value. After reduction, the resulting encoding $\hat{c}_1$ will be such that

$$\hat{c}_1 \equiv (\hat{r}_i \cdot g_i + m_i)/z \pmod{p_i}, \tag{8}$$

with $|\hat{r}_i \cdot g_i + m_i| \leqslant \ell \cdot 2^{\rho+\alpha} \cdot 2^{\rho+\alpha} + (\gamma + \lfloor \log_2 \ell \rfloor + 1) \cdot 2^\rho \leqslant 2\ell \cdot 2^{2\rho+2\alpha}$ for all i.

More generally to generate a level-k encoding we compute $c_k = c_0 \cdot y^k$, and the size of c_k can be iteratively reduced after each multiplication by y using ladders of similarly designed level-k encodings $\{X_j^{(k')}\}_{j=0}^{\gamma+\lfloor \log_2 \ell \rfloor}$ for levels $k' = 1, \ldots, k$.

Re-randomization: $c' \leftarrow \mathsf{reRand}(\mathsf{pp}, k, \hat{c}_k)$. Our re-randomization procedure is similar to [CLT13] except that again we cannot reduce the encodings modulo x_0. We describe the re-randomization of encodings at level $k = 1$; the procedure can be easily adapted to randomize at level $k > 1$. We publish as part of our instance-generation a set of $n + 1$ integers Π_j:

$$1 \leqslant j \leqslant n+1, \qquad \Pi_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \varpi_{ij} \cdot g_i \cdot u_i + \varpi_{n+1,j} \cdot x_0$$

where the u_i's are appropriate CRT coefficients so that the Π_j's are all level-1 random encodings of zero:

$$1 \leqslant j \leqslant n+1, \qquad \Pi_j \equiv \frac{\varpi_{ij} \cdot g_i}{z} \pmod{p_i}.$$

Namely, we let for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$:

$$u_i := \left(z^{-1} \cdot \left(\frac{x_0}{p_i} \right)^{-1} \bmod p_i \right) \cdot \frac{x_0}{p_i} \tag{9}$$

The matrix $\boldsymbol{\Pi} = (\varpi_{ij}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{(n+1) \times (n+1)}$ is a diagonally dominant matrix generated as follows: the non-diagonal entries are randomly and independently generated in $(-2^\rho, 2^\rho) \cap \mathbb{Z}$, while the diagonal entries are randomly generated in $((n+1)2^\rho, (n+2)2^\rho) \cap \mathbb{Z}$.

We also publish as part of our instance-generation a set of τ integers x_j:

$$1 \leqslant j \leqslant \tau, \qquad x_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n} r_{ij} \cdot g_i \cdot u_i + r_{n+1,j} \cdot x_0$$

so that each x_j is a level-1 random encoding of zero:

$$1 \leqslant j \leqslant \tau, \qquad x_j \equiv \frac{r_{ij} \cdot g_i}{z} \pmod{p_i}$$

and where the column vectors of the matrix $\boldsymbol{X} = (r_{ij}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{(n+1) \times \tau}$ are randomly and independently generated in the half-open parallelepiped spanned by the columns of the previous matrix $\boldsymbol{\Pi}$; an algorithm to generate such r_i's is described in [CLT13, Appendix E]; we obtain $|r_{ij} \cdot g_i| \leqslant 3n2^{\rho+\alpha}$ for all i, j.

Given as input a (reduced) level-1 encoding $\hat{c}_1$ as given by Eq. (8), we randomize $\hat{c}_1$ with a random subset-sum of the x_j's and a linear combination of the Π_j's, over $\mathbb{Z}$:

$$c_1' = \hat{c}_1 + \sum_{j=1}^{\tau} b_j \cdot x_j + \sum_{j=1}^{n+1} b_j' \cdot \Pi_j \tag{10}$$

where $b_j \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, and $b_j' \leftarrow [0, 2^\mu) \cap \mathbb{Z}$, where $\mu := \rho + \alpha + \lambda$. The following Lemma shows that as required the distribution of c_1' is nearly independent of the input (as long as it encodes the same $\boldsymbol{m}$). This essentially follows from the "leftover hash lemma over lattices" of [CLT13, Sect. 4.2]; the proof is given in the full version of this paper [CLT15].

Lemma 2. *Let the encodings $c \leftarrow \mathsf{samp}(\mathsf{pp})$, $\hat{c}_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{enc}(\mathsf{pp}, 1, c)$, and c_1' as given by (10). Write $c_1' \equiv (r_i \cdot g_i + m_i)/z \pmod{p_i}$ for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$ and $r_{n+1} = (c_1' - \sum r_i \cdot g_i \cdot u_i)/x_0$, and define $\boldsymbol{r} = (r_1, \ldots, r_n, r_{n+1})^T$. If $2(\rho + \alpha + \lambda) \leqslant \eta$ and $\tau \geqslant (n+2) \cdot \rho + 2\lambda$, then the distribution of $(\mathsf{pp}, \boldsymbol{r})$ is statistically close to that of $(\mathsf{pp}, \boldsymbol{r'})$, where $\boldsymbol{r'} \in \mathbb{Z}^{n+1}$ is randomly generated in the half-open parallelepiped spanned by the column vectors of $2^\mu \boldsymbol{\Pi}$. Moreover we have $|r_i \cdot g_i + m_i| \leqslant 4n^2 \cdot 2^{2\rho+2\alpha+\lambda}$ for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$.*

Finally, we can reduce the size of c_1' down to the size of x_0 using the ladder $\{X_j^{(1)}\}$, and we obtain an encoding $\hat{c}_1'$. Writing $\hat{c}_1' \equiv (\hat{r}_i' \cdot g_i + m_i)/z \pmod{p_i}$, we obtain

$$|\hat{r}_i' \cdot g_i + m_i| \leqslant 4n^2 \cdot 2^{2\rho+2\alpha+\lambda} + (\gamma + \lfloor \log_2 \ell \rfloor + 1) \cdot 2^\rho \leqslant 5n^2 \cdot 2^{2\rho+2\alpha+\lambda}.$$

Adding, Negating and Multiplying Encodings. As in [CLT13] we can add, negate and multiply encodings. The difference is that we do those operations over $\mathbb{Z}$ instead of modulo x_0. More precisely, given level-one encodings v_j of vectors $\boldsymbol{m}_j \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ for $1 \leqslant j \leqslant \kappa$, with $v_j \equiv (r_{ij} \cdot g_i + m_{ij})/z \pmod{p_i}$, we compute over $\mathbb{Z}$:

$$v = \prod_{j=1}^{\kappa} v_j.$$

This gives:

$$v \equiv \frac{\prod_{j=1}^{\kappa} (r_{ij} \cdot g_i + m_{ij})}{z^{\kappa}} \equiv \frac{r_i \cdot g_i + \left(\prod_{j=1}^{\kappa} m_{ij} \right) \bmod g_i}{z^{\kappa}} \pmod{p_i}$$

for some integers $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}$. Hence we obtain a level-κ encoding of the vector $\boldsymbol{m}$ obtained by componentwise product of the vectors $\boldsymbol{m}_j$, as long as the components do not wrap modulo p_i, that is $\prod_{j=1}^{\kappa}(r_{ij} \cdot g_i + m_{ij}) < p_i$ for all i. Then, using the ladder $X_j^{(\kappa)}$ one can reduce its size down to the size of x_0, at the cost of an additive increase in absolute value of the noise.

In multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange we compute the product of κ level-1 encodings from reRand and one level-0 encoding from samp, which gives from previous bounds for all i:

$$|r_i| \leqslant (6n^2 2^{2\rho+2\alpha+\lambda})^{\kappa} \cdot \ell \cdot 2^{\rho+1}$$

In Sect. 5 we describe an optimization in which we publish a multiple x_0' of x_0; then all intermediate encodings can be reduced modulo x_0', instead of using a ladder of encodings of zero; only at the last stage do we need a ladder of a few level-κ encodings of zero.

Zero Testing. isZero$(\mathsf{pp}, \boldsymbol{p}_{zt}, c) \stackrel{?}{=} 0/1$. To prevent the Cheon et al. attack, we keep the same encoding as in (1) but we compute the p_{zt} differently; this is the most important difference. Let c be a level-κ encoding. We assume $0 \leqslant c < x_0$, as a result of approximate modular reduction using a ladder of level-κ encodings of 0. From (5) we can write by CRT:

$$c \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{r_i \cdot g_i + m_i}{z^{\kappa}} \bmod p_i \right) \cdot \left(\left(\frac{x_0}{p_i} \right)^{-1} \bmod p_i \right) \cdot \frac{x_0}{p_i} \pmod{x_0}$$

$$c \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(r_i + m_i \cdot g_i^{-1} \bmod p_i \right) \cdot \left(g_i \cdot z^{-\kappa} \cdot \left(\frac{x_0}{p_i} \right)^{-1} \bmod p_i \right) \cdot \frac{x_0}{p_i} \pmod{x_0}$$

Therefore we can write over the integers:

$$c = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(r_i + m_i \cdot g_i^{-1} \bmod p_i \right) \cdot u_i' - a \cdot x_0 \tag{11}$$

for some integer a, where the u_i''s are the scaled CRT coefficients:

$$u_i' = \left(g_i \cdot z^{-\kappa} \cdot \left(\frac{x_0}{p_i} \right)^{-1} \mod p_i \right) \cdot \frac{x_0}{p_i} \qquad (12)$$

We generate a random prime integer N of size $\gamma + 2\eta + 1$ bits. Using LLL in dimension 2, we obtain[2] pairs of nonzero integers (α_i, β_i) satisfying:

$$|\alpha_i| < 2^{\eta-1} \qquad |\beta_i| \leqslant \frac{4}{3} \cdot \frac{N}{2^{\eta-1}} < 2^{2-\eta} \cdot N \qquad \beta_i \equiv \alpha_i \cdot (u_i'/p_i) \pmod{N}.$$

We also generate as in [CLT13] an integer matrix $\boldsymbol{H} = (h_{ij}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times n}$ such that $\boldsymbol{H}$ is invertible in $\mathbb{Z}$ and both $\|\boldsymbol{H}^T\|_\infty \leqslant 2^\beta$ and $\|(\boldsymbol{H}^{-1})^T\|_\infty \leqslant 2^\beta$, for some parameter β specified later; here $\|\cdot\|_\infty$ is the operator norm on $n \times n$ matrices with respect to the ℓ^∞ norm on $\mathbb{R}^n$. A technique for generating such $\boldsymbol{H}$ is discussed in the full version of this paper [CLT15]. We then publish as part of our instance generation the following zero-testing vector $\boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$:

$$(\boldsymbol{p}_{zt})_j = \sum_{i=1}^n h_{ij} \cdot \alpha_i \cdot p_i^{-1} \mod N \qquad (13)$$

To determine whether a level-κ encoding c is an encoding of zero or not, we compute the vector $\boldsymbol{\omega} = c \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \mod N$ and test whether $\|\boldsymbol{\omega}\|_\infty$ is small:

$$\mathsf{isZero}(\mathsf{pp}, \boldsymbol{p}_{zt}, c) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \|c \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \mod N\|_\infty < N \cdot 2^{-\nu} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

for some parameter ν specified later.

Namely for a level-κ ciphertext c we obtain from (11):

$$(\boldsymbol{\omega})_j = (c \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \mod N)_j = \sum_{i=1}^n h_{ij} \cdot \alpha_i \cdot p_i^{-1} \cdot c \mod N$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n h_{ij} \cdot \alpha_i \cdot p_i^{-1} \cdot \left(\sum_{k=1}^n (r_k + m_k \cdot g_k^{-1} \mod p_k) \cdot u_k' - a \cdot x_0 \right) \mod N$$

which gives:

$$(\boldsymbol{\omega})_j = \sum_{i=1}^n h_{ij} \cdot \left(\left(r_i + m_i \cdot g_i^{-1} \mod p_i \right) \cdot \beta_i \right.$$

$$\left. + \alpha_i \cdot \sum_{k=1,\ k \neq i}^n \left(r_k + m_k \cdot g_k^{-1} \mod p_k \right) \cdot \frac{u_k'}{p_i} - a \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \frac{x_0}{p_i} \right) \mod N \quad (14)$$

---

[2] More precisely, we apply Legendre reduction to the 2-dimensional lattice generated by the rows of $\begin{pmatrix} \lceil N/B^2 \rceil & u_i'/p_i \mod N \\ 0 & N \end{pmatrix}$, where $B = (3/4)^{1/4} 2^{\eta-1}$. The shortest vector is of the form $(\alpha_i \lceil N/B^2 \rceil, \beta_i)$.

Recall that α_i is at most $\eta - 1$ bits, therefore $\alpha_i \cdot u_k'/p_i$ has size at most $\eta - 1 + \gamma - (\eta - 1) = \gamma$ bits; the integer $\alpha_i \cdot x_0/p_i$ has size also at most γ bits; moreover β_i is at most $|N| - \eta + 1$ bits. Therefore in Eq. (14) the integers β_i, $\alpha_i \cdot u_k/p_i$ and $\alpha_i \cdot x_0/p_i$ are all small compared to N. This implies that if $m_i = 0$ for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$, then ω_j will be small compared to N, when the r_i's are small enough, i.e. a limited number of additions/multiplications on encodings has been performed. Conversely if $m_i \neq 0$ for some i we show that $\|\boldsymbol{\omega}\|_\infty$ must be large. This shows the correctness of our zero-testing procedure. More precisely we prove the following lemma in the full version of this paper [CLT15].

Lemma 3. *Let n, η, α and β be as in our parameter setting. Let ρ_f be such that $\alpha + \log_2 n < \rho_f \leqslant \eta - 2\beta - 2\alpha - \lambda - 8$, and let $\nu = \eta - \rho_f - \beta - \lambda - 3 \geqslant 2\alpha + \beta + 5$. Let c be such that $c \equiv (r_i \cdot g_i + m_i)/z^\kappa \pmod{p_i}$ for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$, where $0 \leqslant m_i < g_i$ for all i. Let $\boldsymbol{r} = (r_i)_{1 \leqslant i \leqslant n}$ and assume that $\|\boldsymbol{r}\|_\infty < 2^{\rho_f}$. If $\boldsymbol{m} = 0$ then $\|\boldsymbol{\omega}\|_\infty < 2^{-\nu - \lambda} \cdot N$. Conversely if $\boldsymbol{m} \neq 0$ then $\|\boldsymbol{\omega}\|_\infty > 2^{-\nu + 2} \cdot N$.*

Extraction. $sk \leftarrow \mathsf{ext}(\mathsf{pp}, \boldsymbol{p}_{zt}, u_\kappa)$. This part is essentially the same as in [GGH13a]. To extract a random function of the vector $\boldsymbol{m}$ encoded in a level-κ encoding c, we multiply c by the zero-testing parameter $\boldsymbol{p}_{zt}$ modulo N, collect the ν most significant bits of each of the n components of the resulting vector, and apply a strong randomness extractor (using the seed s from pp):

$$\mathsf{ext}(\mathsf{pp}, \boldsymbol{p}_{zt}, c) = \mathsf{Extract}_s\big(\mathsf{msbs}_\nu(c \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \bmod N)\big)$$

where msbs_ν extracts the ν most significant bits of the result.

Namely if two encodings c and c' encode the same $\boldsymbol{m} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ then from Lemma 3 we have $\|(c - c') \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \bmod N\|_\infty < N \cdot 2^{-\nu - \lambda}$, and therefore we expect that $\boldsymbol{\omega} = c \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \bmod N$ and $\boldsymbol{\omega}' = c' \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \bmod N$ agree on their ν most significant bits, and therefore extract to the same value.

Conversely if c and c' encode different vectors then by Lemma 3 we must have $\|(c - c') \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \bmod N\|_\infty > N \cdot 2^{-\nu + 2}$, and therefore the ν most significant bits of the corresponding $\boldsymbol{\omega}$ and $\boldsymbol{\omega}'$ must be different. This implies that for random $\boldsymbol{m} \in R = \mathbb{Z}_{g_1} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{g_n}$ the min-entropy of $\mathsf{msbs}_\nu(c \cdot \boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \bmod N)$ when c encodes $\boldsymbol{m}$ is at least $\log_2 |R| \geqslant n(\alpha - 1)$. Therefore we can use a strong randomness extractor to extract a nearly uniform bit-string of length $\lfloor \log_2 |R| \rfloor - \lambda$.

This concludes the description of our new multilinear encoding scheme.

Remark 1. By comparing Eqs. (2) and (4) we see that the original CLT scheme is a particular case with $N = x_0$ and $\alpha_i = 0$ for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$. Therefore the main difference of our construction is that it incorporates the additional term a, which depends on the r_i's in a non-linear way; this is to prevent the Cheon et al. attack (see Sect. 3).

2.2 Setting the Parameters

The constraints on the system parameters are similar to [CLT13].

- The bit-size ρ of the randomness used for encodings must satisfy $\rho = \Omega(\lambda)$ to avoid brute force attack on the noise. The improved attacks from [CN12] and [LS14] both have complexity $\tilde{O}(2^{\rho/2})$, but with a large overhead, so in practice we can take $\rho = \lambda$.
- The bit-size α of the primes g_i must be large enough so that the order of the group $R = \mathbb{Z}_{g_1} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_{g_n}$ does not contain small prime factors (see the full version of this paper [CLT15]). One can take $\alpha = \lambda$.
- The parameter n must be large enough to thwart lattice-based attacks on the encodings, namely $n = \omega(\eta \log \lambda)$; see Sect. 4.
- The number ℓ of level-0 encodings x'_j for samp must satisfy $\ell \geqslant n \cdot \alpha + 2\lambda$ in order to apply the leftover hash lemma; see Lemma 1.
- The number τ of level-1 encodings x_j must satisfy $\tau \geqslant (n+2) \cdot \rho + 2\lambda$ in order to apply the leftover hash lemma over lattices; see Lemma 2.
- As a conservative security precaution, we take $\beta = 3\lambda$ (see the full version of this paper [CLT15]).
- The bit-size η of the primes p_i must satisfy $\eta \geqslant \rho_f + 2\alpha + 2\beta + \lambda + 8$, where ρ_f is the maximum bit size of the randoms r_i a level-κ encoding (see Lemma 3). When computing the product of κ level-1 encodings and an additional level-0 encoding (as in a multipartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange with $\kappa + 1$ users), one obtains $\rho_f = \kappa \cdot (2\rho + 2\alpha + \lambda + 2\log_2 n + 3) + \rho + \log_2 \ell + 1$ (see previous Section).
- We set $\nu = \eta - \rho_f - \lambda - \beta - 3$ for the number of most significant bits to extract (see Lemma 3).

2.3   Security of Our Construction

As in the original CLT scheme [CLT13] and in the GGH scheme [GGH13a] the security of our construction does not seem to be reducible to more classical assumptions, such as for example the Approximate-GCD problem. To prove the security of the one-round $(\kappa + 1)$-way Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, as in [GGH13a] one must therefore make the assumption that solving the Graded DDH problem (GDDH) is hard in our scheme; see the full version of this paper [CLT15].

3   Cheon et al. Attack

The goal of this section is to argue that the Cheon et al. attack [CHL+15] is prevented in our new construction.

3.1   Attack Description

We first recall the Cheon et al. attack against the original CLT scheme. This attack makes use of low-level encodings of 0: if such encodings are made public, one can recover in polynomial time all secret parameters. In the CLT scheme

such encodings of 0 are used for the rerandomization procedure, therefore the Cheon et al. attack leads to a complete break of CLT.

In the following we describe a slight simplification of [CHL+15] in which only a single ciphertext c is used instead of two ciphertexts c_0 and c_1; this enables to obtain as eigenvalues directly the CRT components of c, instead of the ratios of the CRT components of c_0 and c_1. For simplicity we assume $\kappa = 2$; the attack is easily extended to any $\kappa > 2$. Let c be a level-0 encoding with $c \equiv c_i$ (mod p_i). Let x be a level-1 encoding with $x \equiv x_i/z$ (mod p_i), and let x' be a level-1 encoding of 0 with $x' \equiv r'_i \cdot g_i/z$ (mod p_i). Let c' be the level-κ product encoding

$$c' = x \cdot c \cdot x' \bmod x_0$$

From $c' \equiv x_i \cdot c_i \cdot r'_i \cdot g_i \cdot z^{-2}$ (mod p_i), we obtain by CRT:

$$c' \equiv \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \cdot c_i \cdot r'_i \cdot u_i \pmod{x_0} \tag{15}$$

with the CRT coefficients:

$$u_i = \left(g_i \cdot z^{-2} \cdot \left(\frac{x_0}{p_i} \right)^{-1} \bmod p_i \right) \cdot \frac{x_0}{p_i}$$

In the original CLT scheme, the zero-testing parameter p_{zt} is given by

$$p_{zt} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} h_i \cdot \left(z^2 \cdot g_i^{-1} \bmod p_i \right) \cdot \frac{x_0}{p_i} \bmod x_0$$

Using $p_{zt} \cdot u_i \equiv h_i \cdot x_0/p_i$ (mod x_0) for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$, we obtain from (15):

$$\omega = [p_{zt} \cdot c']_{x_0} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \cdot c_i \cdot r'_i \cdot h_i \cdot x_0/p_i \tag{16}$$

where the last equality holds over $\mathbb{Z}$ because c' is an encoding of 0.

More generally, let x_j be level-1 encodings with $x_j \equiv x_{ij}/z$ (mod p_i), and let x'_k be a level-1 encodings of 0 with $x'_k \equiv r'_{ik} \cdot g_i/z$ (mod p_i). One can therefore compute for $1 \leqslant j, k \leqslant n$:

$$\omega_{jk} = [(x_j \cdot c \cdot x'_k) \cdot p_{zt}]_{x_0} \tag{17}$$

which gives as previously:

$$\omega_{jk} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{ij} \cdot c_i \cdot r'_{ik} \cdot h_i \cdot x_0/p_i \tag{18}$$

over the integers. We note that ω_{jk} is a diagonal quadratic form over $\mathbb{Z}$ in the x_{ij}'s and the r'_{ik}'s. By spanning $1 \leqslant j, k \leqslant n$, one can construct a matrix $\boldsymbol{W}_c = (\omega_{jk})_{1 \leqslant j,k \leqslant n}$ such that

$$\boldsymbol{W}_c = \boldsymbol{X} \times \boldsymbol{C} \times \boldsymbol{R}, \tag{19}$$

where $C = \mathsf{diag}(c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_n)$, $X = (x_{ij} \cdot h_i \cdot x_0 / p_i)_{1 \leqslant j, i \leqslant n}$ and $R = (r'_{ik})_{1 \leqslant i, k \leqslant n}$.

We perform the same computation with $c = 1$ in (17); one can therefore compute a matrix W_1 such that $W_1 = X \times I \times R$, where I is the $n \times n$ identity matrix. Finally, one can publicly compute:

$$W = W_c \cdot W_1^{-1} = X \times C \times X^{-1}.$$

Since C is a diagonal matrix, by computing the eigenvalues of W one can recover the c_i's, and then the p_i's. Finally, Cheon et al. describe how to recover all the other secret values in [CHL+15].

Extension. A similar attack applies against two independent approaches to fix the CLT scheme, [GGHZ14, Sect. 7] and [BWZ14], proposed shortly after the Cheon et al. attack. Namely, although the two countermeasures do not expose encodings of zero, the value ω from the zero-testing procedure can still be expressed as a diagonal quadratic form in the CRT components of encodings, as in Eq. (18), hence the two countermeasure can be broken by the same technique; we refer to [CLT14] for a description of the modified attacks.

3.2   Non-applicability of Cheon et al. Attack

In this section we explain why the above attack does not apply against our new scheme. As previously we let x be a level-1 encoding with $x \equiv x_i / z \pmod{p_i}$, and let x' be a level-1 encoding of 0 with $x' \equiv r'_i \cdot g_i / z \pmod{p_i}$. We consider as previously the level-κ product encoding, with $\kappa = 2$:

$$c' = x \cdot c \cdot x'$$

Here we cannot reduce c' modulo x_0 since x_0 is kept private; instead we must use a ladder of level-2 encodings of zero. Let c'' be the resulting encoding, with $0 \leqslant c'' < x_0$; we obtain:

$$c'' \equiv c' + \frac{s_i \cdot g_i}{z^2} \pmod{p_i}$$

for some integers s_i of size roughly ρ bits. Therefore instead of (15) we obtain over the integers:

$$c'' = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i \cdot c_i \cdot r'_i + s_i) \cdot u_i - a \cdot x_0 \tag{20}$$

for some integer a. Using the new definition of $p_{zt} \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, and letting $v_i = p_{zt} \cdot u_i \bmod N$ for all $1 \leqslant i \leqslant n$ and $v_0 = p_{zt} \cdot x_0 \bmod N$, we obtain from (20):

$$\omega = [p_{zt} \cdot c'']_N = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i \cdot c_i \cdot r'_i + s_i) \cdot v_i - a \cdot v_0 \tag{21}$$

where as previously the last equality holds over $\mathbb{Z}$.

Now comparing equalities (16) and (21), we see that we obtain two additional terms: the s_i's and the integer a. The s_i's come from reducing c' with the ladder of level-κ encodings of 0, so that eventually $0 \leqslant c'' < x_0$; therefore the s_i's depend on $x \cdot c \cdot x'$ in a non-linear way. Similarly the integer a in (21), which is the quotient of the division of $\sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i \cdot c_i \cdot r_i' + s_i) \cdot u_i$ by x_0, depends on the $x_i \cdot c_i \cdot x_i'$ in a non-linear way. Therefore, if we apply Cheon et al. attack, we do not obtain a quadratic form as in (18) anymore.

More precisely, we can let as previously x_j be level-1 encodings with $x_j \equiv x_{ij}/z \pmod{p_i}$, and let x_k' be a level-1 encodings of 0 with $x_k' \equiv r_{ik}' \cdot g_i/z$ $\pmod{p_i}$. As previously for all $1 \leqslant j, k \leqslant n$, we can compute the product encodings $c_{jk}' = x_j \cdot c \cdot x_k'$ and we let c_{jk}'' be the encodings obtained after reducing c_{jk}' such that $0 \leqslant c_{jk}'' < x_0$, using the ladder of level-κ encodings of zero. This gives:

$$\omega_{jk} = [p_{zt} \cdot c_{jk}'']_N = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_{ij} \cdot c_i \cdot r_{ik}' + s_{ijk}) \cdot v_i - a_{jk} \cdot v_0 \tag{22}$$

for integers s_{ijk} and a_{jk}. Compared to (18), we see that the previous equation has two additional terms s_{ijk} and a_{jk}. As previously we can write:

$$\boldsymbol{W_c} = \boldsymbol{X} \times \boldsymbol{C} \times \boldsymbol{R} + \boldsymbol{S} - \boldsymbol{A} \cdot v_0 \tag{23}$$

for some matrices $\boldsymbol{S}$ and $\boldsymbol{A}$. However we see that the previous attack does not apply, because of the additional terms $\boldsymbol{S}$ and $\boldsymbol{A} \cdot v_0$. Namely if as previously we perform the same computation with $c = 1$, we obtain:

$$\boldsymbol{W_1} = \boldsymbol{X} \times \boldsymbol{I} \times \boldsymbol{R} + \boldsymbol{S'} - \boldsymbol{A'} \cdot v_0 \tag{24}$$

but as opposed to the CLT scheme we cannot get a simple expression for $\boldsymbol{W} = \boldsymbol{W_c} \times \boldsymbol{W_1}^{-1}$. More generally, as opposed to the CLT case, it seems difficult to extract useful information about $\boldsymbol{C}$ from the matrices $\boldsymbol{W_c}$ and $\boldsymbol{W_1}$, since in Eqs. (23) and (24) all terms $\boldsymbol{X}$, $\boldsymbol{R}$, $\boldsymbol{S}$, $\boldsymbol{S'}$, $\boldsymbol{A}$, $\boldsymbol{A'}$ and v_0 are unknown.

Remark 2. If we do not reduce c_{jk}' with the ladder of encodings, the s_{ijk} terms disappear but the integers a_{jk} becomes too large and (22) does not hold over $\mathbb{Z}$ anymore. The equation still holds modulo N, however there is still the additional term a_{jk} that prevents the Cheon et al. attack.

3.3   Attack with Known x_0

In this section we describe an extension of the Cheon et al. attack against our scheme when x_0 is known; this explains why x_0 must be kept secret in our scheme.

When x_0 is known, we can reduce the previous ciphertexts c_{jk}' modulo x_0, and therefore the s_{ijk} terms in (22) disappear. Moreover $v_0 = [p_{zt} \cdot x_0]_N$ is known. Therefore we can compute the $\boldsymbol{W_c}$ matrix as previously, and we obtain from (23) with $\boldsymbol{S} = 0$:

$$\boldsymbol{W_c} = \boldsymbol{X} \times \boldsymbol{C} \times \boldsymbol{R} \bmod v_0$$

which is the same equation as (19) in the original attack except that it holds modulo v_0 instead of over $\mathbb{Z}$.

Therefore we can apply the Cheon et al. attack modulo v_0 instead of over $\mathbb{Z}$. If v_0 is prime, one can recover the eigenvalues of $\boldsymbol{W} = \boldsymbol{W_c} \cdot \boldsymbol{W_1}^{-1} \bmod v_0$ by factoring the characteristic polynomial modulo v_0, which reveals the c_i's as previously. If a prime p can be extracted from v_0, one can still apply the attack modulo p and recover the c_i's modulo p; for large enough p this reveals the c_i's; alternatively for sufficiently many such primes p, the c_i's could be recovered by CRT.

Actually the attack also works even if v_0 is hard to factor and no prime can be extracted. Namely the eigenvalues c_i's are small, so to recover the roots of the characteristic polynomial one can use Coppersmith's first theorem for finding small roots of polynomial equations modulo an integer of unknown factorization [Cop97]. Namely Coppersmith's bound applies: with a modulus v_0 of size roughly γ bits and a characteristic polynomial of degree n, the roots have size only roughly ρ bits, with $\rho \ll \eta \simeq \gamma/n$.

3.4   Attack for Small Multiple of x_0

In Sect. 5 we describe an optimization with a known multiple $x_0' = q \cdot x_0$, in order to avoid the ladder of encodings of 0. Here we show that we cannot take a too small multiple x_0', otherwise the attacker can compute:

$$v_0' = [p_{zt} \cdot x_0']_N = [p_{zt} \cdot q \cdot x_0]_N = q \cdot v_0 \bmod N$$

where, as in Sect. 3.3, we let $v_0 := p_{zt} \cdot x_0 \bmod N$. If the prime q is small enough then the previous equation holds over the integers, and the attacker obtains $v_0' = q \cdot v_0$. Therefore the attacker can possibly extract a few primes from v_0' and therefore from v_0. Letting b be a divisor of v_0, one could then apply the Cheon et al. attack modulo b instead of modulo v_0 and recover all secret parameters. Therefore one should make sure that $q \cdot v_0$ is greater than N. Letting η_q be the bitsize of q, this gives the condition $\eta_q + \gamma \geqslant \gamma + 2\eta + 1$. Therefore we can take $\eta_q = 2\eta + \lambda$.

3.5   The Subgroup Membership and Decision Linear Problems

In the full version of this paper [CLT15] we also explain why the subgroup membership (SubM) and decisional linear (DLIN) problems, which are known to be easy in the GGH scheme [GGH13a], seem to be hard in our new setting.

4   Lattice Attacks

4.1   Lattice Attack on the Encodings

The first attack considered in [CLT13] against the original CLT scheme was based on computing a short basis for the lattice of vectors orthogonal modulo x_0

to $\boldsymbol{x} = (x_j)_{1 \leqslant j \leqslant t}$, where the x_j's are level-0 encodings of zero [CLT13, Sect. 5.1]. If the reduced basis vectors are short enough, they can reveal the noise values of the x_j's and hence break the scheme.

The attack does not apply directly to our modified scheme, because x_0 is now secret, and it is therefore no longer possible to compute a basis for the lattice of vectors orthogonal to $\boldsymbol{x}$ modulo x_0. However, we can also mount the attack using the lattice $\boldsymbol{x}^\perp$ of vectors orthogonal to $\boldsymbol{x}$ over $\mathbb{Z}$, or the lattice of vectors orthogonal to $\boldsymbol{x}$ modulo some multiple x_0' of x_0 when using the optimization suggested in Sect. 5 below.

Just as in [CLT13, Sect. 5.1], though, the complexity of these extended attacks remains exponential in n; it is in fact slightly worse, because the new lattice has slightly longer vectors for a given choice of the lattice dimension t. In particular, the complexity lower bound of $2^{\Omega(\gamma/\eta^2)}$ applies *a fortiori*. The attack is therefore defeated by letting $n = \omega(\eta \log \lambda)$.

4.2   Lattice Attack Against p_{zt}

From $x_0 = \prod_{i=1}^{n} p_i$ and $(\boldsymbol{p}_{zt})_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n} h_{ij} \cdot \alpha_i \cdot p_i^{-1} \bmod N$, we obtain:

$$x_0 \cdot (\boldsymbol{p}_{zt})_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n} h_{ij} \cdot \alpha_i \cdot \frac{x_0}{p_i} \bmod N.$$

Now x_0 is of size γ bits, and the right-hand side of this congruence, which we denote by w_j, is bounded above by $n2^{\beta+\gamma}$: they are both small compared to N. Therefore, if we consider a vector $\boldsymbol{p}$ formed by a subset of the $(\boldsymbol{p}_{zt})_j$'s, say $\boldsymbol{p} = \big((\boldsymbol{p}_{zt})_j\big)_{1 \leqslant j \leqslant t} \in \mathbb{Z}^t$, it may be possible to recover $\boldsymbol{w} = (w_j)_{1 \leqslant j \leqslant t}$ as a short vector in the lattice generated by $\boldsymbol{p}$ and $N\mathbb{Z}^t$, and obtain x_0 accordingly.

We describe the attack in more details in the full version of this paper [CLT15]. We show that the lattice attack has a complexity lower bound of $2^{\Omega(n/\eta)} = 2^{\Omega(\gamma/\eta^2)}$, just as in Sect. 4.1. Thus, this attack is thwarted by our choice of parameters.

In the full version of this paper [CLT15], we consider three other lattice attacks on the zero-testing parameter p_{zt}, which are variants of the lattice attacks considered in [CLT13, Sects. 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4]. We show that they are also thwarted by our choice of parameters.

5   Optimizations and Implementation

In this section we describe an implementation of our new multilinear map scheme in the one-round $(\kappa+1)$-way Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol; we recall the protocol in the full version of this paper [CLT15], following [BS03, GGH13a]. We use the following optimizations, described in details in the full version of this paper [CLT15]:

1. Integer p_{zt}: as in [CLT13] we use a single integer p_{zt} instead of a vector $\boldsymbol{p}_{zt}$ with n components, as this is enough for Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Moreover the integer N can be generated as the product of large enough prime integers, instead of being prime.
2. Known multiple of x_0: we publish a multiple $x'_0 = q \cdot x_0$ of x_0, so that all intermediate encodings can be reduced modulo x'_0, instead of using a ladder of encodings of 0 at each level.
3. Quadratic re-randomization: as in [CLT13] we only store a small subset of encodings which are later combined pairwise to generate the full set of encodings. This implies that the randomization of encodings becomes heuristic only. We describe a slightly more efficient variant.

Parameters and Timings. We have implemented a one-round $(\kappa + 1)$-way Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol with $\kappa + 1 = 7$ users, in C++ using the GMP library [Gt14] to perform operations on large integers and fplll [ACPS] for LLL. We provide our concrete parameters and the resulting timings in Table 1, for security parameters ranging from 52 to 80 bits. As in [CLT13], for a security level λ we expect that the best attack requires at least 2^λ clock cycles. The timings of Table 1 show that the implementation of our scheme improves upon the implementation in [CLT13], especially for the Setup phase.

Table 1. Parameters and timings to instantiate a *one-round 7-way Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol* with $\kappa = 6$, $\ell = 2\lambda$ and $\alpha, \beta, \nu = \lambda$ on a 16-core computer (Intel Xeon E7-8837 at 2.67 GHz). Setup was run in parallel on the 16 cores, while the other steps ran on a single core. Publish and KeyGen timings are per party.

Instantiation	λ	κ	n	η	Δ	ρ	$\gamma = n \cdot \eta$	pk size	Setup	Publish	KeyGen
Small	52	6	540	1679	23	52	$0.9 \cdot 10^6$	27 MB	5.9 s	0.10 s	0.17 s
Medium	62	6	2085	1989	45	62	$4.14 \cdot 10^6$	175 MB	36 s	0.33 s	1.06 s
Large	72	6	8250	2306	90	72	$19.0 \cdot 10^6$	1.2 GB	583 s	2.05 s	6.17 s
Extra	80	6	25305	2619	159	85	$66.3 \cdot 10^6$	6.1 GB	4528 s	7.8 s	23.9 s

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