Abstract
This paper shows how to derive a representation of the participants’ knowledge in a cryptographic protocol. The modelization is based on the assumption that the underlying cryptographic system is perfect and is an extension of the “Hidden Automorphism Model” introduced by Merritt. It can be used to establish the security of the protocols.
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© 1992 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Toussaint, MJ. (1992). Deriving the Complete Knowledge of Participants in Cryptographic Protocols. In: Feigenbaum, J. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’91. CRYPTO 1991. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 576. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46766-1_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46766-1_2
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