Abstract
Gemmell and Naor proposed a new protocol for the authentication of long messages which was based on block codes and which used a transmission channel k times. This multiround authentication makes it possible to limit the key size independently of the message length. We propose a new attack and show that the probability analysis made by Gemmell and Naor, which was only based on the minimum distance property of the codes, does not hold for our attack. Considering also the impersonation attack we conclude that the number of rounds have to be odd.
This work was supported by the TFR grant 222 92-662.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
E. Gilbert, F.J. MacWilliams, N. Sloane, “Codes Which Detect Deception”. Bell System Technical Journal. Vol. 53, No. 3. March 1974, pp. 405–424.
J.L. Carter, M.N. Wegman, “New hash functions and their use in authentication and set equality”, J. Computer and System Sci., Vol 22, 1981, pp. 265–279.
G.J. Simmons, “A survey of Information Authentication”, in Contemporary Cryptology, The science for information integrity, ed. G.J. Simmons, IEEE Press, New York, 1992.
T. Johansson, G. Kabatanskii, B. Smeets, “On the relation between A-codes and codes correcting independent errors”, Proceedings of Eurocrypt’ 93, 1993, pp. 1–11.
J. Bierbrauer, T. Johansson, G. Kabatanskii, B. Smeets, “On Families of Hash Functions via Geometric Codes and Concatenation”, Proceedings of CRYPTO’ 93, 1993, pp. 331–342.
D.R. Stinson, “Universal hashing and authentication codes”, to appear in IEEE Transaction on Information Theory.
C. Gehrmann, “Long Message Authentication by using Pseudo-Random Functions”, Proceedings of IEEE ISIT 94, to appear (preprint).
I.S. Reed, G. Solomon, “Polynomial Codes over certain Finite Fields”, J. Soc. Ind. Appl. Math., vol. 8, June 1960, pp. 300–304.
P. Gemmell, M. Naor, “Codes for interactive authentication”, Proceedings of CRYPTO’ 93, 1993, pp. 355–367.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Gehrmann, C. (1994). Cryptanalysis of the Gemmell and Naor Multiround Authentication Protocol. In: Desmedt, Y.G. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’94. CRYPTO 1994. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 839. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48658-5_14
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-58333-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-48658-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive